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Abstract—Advancing human exploration of space beyond Low 
Earth Orbit, and ultimately to Mars, is of great interest to 
NASA, other organizations, and space exploration advocates. 
Various strategies for getting to Mars have been proposed. 
These include NASA’s Design Reference Architecture 5.0, a 
near-term flyby of Mars advocated by the group Inspiration 
Mars, and potential options developed for NASA’s Evolvable 
Mars Campaign. Regardless of which approach is used to get to 
Mars, they all share a need to visualize and analyze their 
proposed campaign and evaluate the feasibility of the launch 
and on-orbit assembly segment of the campaign. The launch and 
assembly segment starts with flight hardware manufacturing 
and ends with final departure of a Mars Transfer Vehicle 
(MTV), or set of MTVs, from an assembly orbit near Earth. This 
paper describes a discrete event simulation based strategic 
visualization and analysis tool that can be used to evaluate the 
launch campaign reliability of any proposed strategy for 
exploration beyond low Earth orbit. The input to the simulation 
can be any manifest of multiple launches and their associated 
transit operations between Earth and the exploration 
destinations, including Earth orbit, lunar orbit, asteroids, 
moons of Mars, and ultimately Mars. The simulation output 
includes expected launch dates and ascent outcomes i.e., success 
or failure. Running 1,000 replications of the simulation provides 
the capability to perform launch campaign reliability analysis to 
determine the probability that all launches occur in a timely 
manner to support departure opportunities and to deliver their 
payloads to the intended orbit. This allows for quantitative 
comparisons between alternative scenarios, as well as the 
capability to analyze options for improving launch campaign 
reliability. Results are presented for representative strategies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ‘Exploration of Mars Launch & Assembly Simulation’ 
has been developed to model launch operations for the next 
40 years of human exploration of space. The model currently 
provides two capabilities. The first is the ability to analyze 
the success probability of the various launch campaigns being 
able to assemble Mars Transfer Vehicles that will be used to 
transport crews to Mars during discrete Trans-Mars-Injection 
windows that occur on an approximate 26-month cycle.  
The second capability of the simulation is an animation 
feature that allows users to visualize mission operations from 
the perspective of looking down upon the solar system. This 
vantage point and compressed timescale enhances the ability 
to comprehend the scale and complexity of the Mars 
campaign options under study far more efficiently than can 
be done with PowerPoint charts or written reports. 
NASA has been analyzing strategies for human exploration 
of Mars for many years. In 2009, NASA published “Human 
Exploration of Mars: Design Reference Architecture 5.0” 
(DRA 5.0) [1] along with a detailed technical addendum [2] 
that describe an operations concept for the first human 
missions to Mars. The Mars DRA 5.0 documents represent 
the most comprehensive study for human exploration of Mars 
published to date and now serve as the point of departure for 
continued studies. 
There have been several key strategic changes since the 2009 
timeframe including the cancellation of the Ares I launch 
vehicle; the replacement of the planned Ares V launch 
vehicle with the Space Launch System (SLS); and reductions 
to the ground processing architecture at the Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). There will now be only a single string 
capability of one mobile launcher, one integration high bay, 
and one launch pad available for launching SLS. These 
changes have significant ramifications to the launch and 
assembly phase of missions to Mars.  
The complex nature of Mars exploration, including launching 
and assembling all the required elements in a timely manner 
to support the planned departure window, makes reliability 
analysis challenging. To assist in the reliability analysis, 
NASA has been developing an integrated methodology to 
analyze launch and assembly reliability. This work builds 
upon previous analyses performed for the Space Shuttle and 
International Space Station Programs [3] [4] [5], the 
Constellation Program [6] [7], the Review of Human Space 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160007817 2019-08-31T02:22:19+00:00Z
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Flight Plans Committee [8], studies performed in 2011 on 
launch and assembly reliability for human exploration 
missions to near-Earth asteroids [9], and studies performed in 
2012 on launch and assembly reliability for human 
exploration of Mars [10]. 
These past efforts were focused upon determining the 
likelihood of being able to launch and assemble one crewed 
exploration vehicle. The new Exploration of Mars Launch & 
Assembly Simulation expands this capability to look at the 
totality of launch and assembly campaigns related to NASA’s 
Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC). EMC represents an 
“ongoing series of architectural trade analyses to define the 
capabilities and elements needed for a sustainable human 
presence on the surface of Mars” [11]. Architectures 
currently being explored within the purview of EMC extend 
from the present to the first several crewed exploration 
missions to the Mars system.  
The current version of the simulation evaluates only ground 
operations, launch, and ascent risks and does not include the 
in-space spacecraft operations and reliability risks, 
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risks, and crew 
health risks that could result in a loss of mission prior to the 
Trans-Mars-Injection burn. This functionality will be added 
in later versions of the simulation, leveraging the earlier 
work.  
Section 2 of this paper describes the complexities and risks 
inherent to launch and assembly of Mars missions. Section 3 
provides a brief overview of Evolvable Mars Campaign 
(EMC) options. Section 4 describes the discrete event 
simulation model used to perform the quantitative analysis. 
Section 5 presents results for EMC options. Conclusions and 
forward work are addressed in Section 6. 
2. COMPLEXITY AND RISKS OF LAUNCH AND 
ASSEMBLY 
Most concepts for crewed missions to Mars require multiple 
launches to assemble one or more Mars transfer vehicles. 
Preparation of launch vehicles and flight hardware, launch 
operations, and in-space assembly of MTVs will be a 
complex endeavor, which will require significant time. 
The integrated launch and assembly reliability methodology 
evaluates operations starting with flight hardware 
manufacturing and ending at the final departure of a Mars 
Transfer Vehicle (MTV) from the Earth assembly orbit. 
Pertinent risk factors are accounted for within a stochastic 
discrete event simulation for each integrated launch and 
assembly campaign. 
There are several constraints that will directly impact the 
launch and assembly reliability. Foremost of these constraints 
is the limited duration of the window of opportunity for MTV 
departure from the Earth assembly orbit. Minimum energy 
departure opportunities to Mars are available from an 
assumed Earth-vicinity location for an assumed period of 
approximately 30 days every 26 months. The assumed 
duration is similar to other NASA Mars mission 
opportunities. NASA’s Curiosity rover had a three-week 
launch opportunity. The Earth departure opportunity for 
NASA’s next mission to Mars called InSight lasts 27 days 
from March 4 to March 30, 2016. The actual duration of the 
departure window may vary depending upon the delta 
velocity capacity of future MTVs and the launch opportunity. 
The assembly sequence will begin long before the opening of 
the departure window. However, if the MTV is not assembled 
and ready to depart in time to meet the window, the 
opportunity is missed. MTV elements stranded in Earth orbit 
would not likely be suitable for a Mars mission after an 
additional 26 month loiter. Consequently, that investment 
would be considered lost. 
Constraints in addition to the limited departure opportunities 
include: the reliability of the launch vehicles, the reliability 
and on-orbit lifetime capacity of the elements being placed in 
Earth orbit (which, as previously stated, are not included in 
this iteration), and variability in the performance of the 
ground processing architecture and workforce in preparing 
launch vehicles and their respective payload elements. 
The types of risks involved in the launch and assembly of the 
MTVs can be divided into two major categories: Pre-Launch 
Risks and Post-Launch Risks. Pre-Launch Risks are those 
that occur prior to ignition of the main engines of the launch 
vehicle for any launch that supports the mission. These risks 
involve all of the activities required to manufacture, deliver, 
assemble, and prepare each vehicle for launch. The analysis 
presented in this paper includes those risks. Post-Launch 
Risks are those that occur after the ignition of the main 
engines of the launch vehicle and involve all of the activities 
required to position and assemble elements, deliver the crew 
to the MTVs, and prepare for departure. Only the launch 
vehicle ascent reliability risk has been included in the current 
analysis. For more in-depth information on the risks, please 
refer to References [9] [10] [14]. 
During the period that Mars DRA 5.0 was developed, NASA 
was planning on a robust ground processing architecture that 
made use of multiple launch vehicle integration high bays in 
the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at the KSC along with 
multiple mobile launchers and two launch pads. Since that 
time, NASA has scaled back the plans such that only a 
“single-string” capacity is being put in place. This means that 
there will only be one mobile launcher, one launch pad, and 
one launch vehicle integration high bay. This concept 
essentially precludes parallel processing of multiple launch 
vehicles, necessitating longer intervals between subsequent 
SLS launches. 
Launch timeliness reliability is a significant issue for all Mars 
campaigns given the number of launch vehicles required and 
the constrained Earth departure window. DRA 5.0 
acknowledged this fact by concluding that approximately 90-
180 days of margin should be inserted in the launch campaign 
between the last launch of the campaign and the opening of 
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the Earth departure window. However, given the new reality 
of a single-string ground processing architecture, the 
difficulty in launching a large number of vehicles in a timely 
manner is increased. Therefore, it is not clear that 90-180 
days of margin will be adequate to ensure overall launch 
campaign reliability.  
The constraints and risks described herein require that 
missions be designed in a way that the total achieved launch 
and assembly reliability will result in an acceptable 
probability of mission success. The reliability and the timing 
of launch and assembly events must be carefully evaluated in 
order to identify and mitigate those risks. Consequently, 
NASA will need the capability to measure and manage the 
probability of being able to launch and assemble the MTVs. 
3. EVOLVABLE MARS CAMPAIGN CONCEPTS 
The Evolvable Mars Campaign is looking at a number of 
different concepts for eventual and sustained human 
exploration of Mars [11]. One of these concepts is based upon 
the use of solar electric propulsion (SEP) to deliver cargo to 
the Mars system and chemical propulsion to deliver the crew. 
This concept is referred to as the ‘Split’ option [12], since 
crew and cargo each utilize different propulsion systems.  
By utilizing SEP for the cargo missions, the cargo missions 
can depart for Mars once launched (since phasing essentially 
occurs in heliocentric space) unlike the crew missions which 
are constrained to fixed departure windows (since they 
contain a high-thrust ballistic component for the departure).  
A change away from SEP would change the overall results 
dramatically.  
A second concept, referred to as the ‘Hybrid’ option [13], 
utilizes a joint SEP and storable chemical propulsion stage to 
deliver both crew and cargo to Mars (both crew and cargo 
missions are constrained to fixed departure windows). The 
Hybrid option also allows for refueling and reuse of in-space 
propellant stages, reducing the need to launch new stages for 
subsequent crewed missions to Mars. These concepts and 
others are being continuously revised. Consequently, it is not 
the intent of this paper to present the entirety of NASA’s 
Evolvable Mars Campaign efforts, but rather just to highlight 
how one particular tool is being used in support of the effort.  
NASA developed notional launch manifests for each of the 
two options described above. That information is initially 
communicated in Power Point charts showing the planned 
launches by fiscal year and within Excel files showing the 
planned launch dates and dates for subsequent in-space 
activities including the Trans-Mars-Injection dates. Figure 1 
depicts a notional EMC campaign manifest for the Split 
option. The years 2014 through approximately 2027 are 
referred to as the “Proving Ground” era by NASA and 
included a mixture of approved missions and those still in the 
planning phase. 
Embedded within this particular campaign manifest are three 
conceptual individual crewed Mars exploration missions that 
begin in earnest in approximately the 2028 timeframe. These 
include a mission to Phobos with a crew Trans-Mars-
Injection (TMI) opportunity in 2033 and two missions to the 
surface of Mars with crew TMI opportunities in 2039 and 
2043. Because launch periods for the three missions overlap 
and the missions will all be utilizing the same ground 
infrastructure at KSC, the launch reliability of the overall 
campaign must be evaluated as a whole, rather than simply 
evaluating independent missions. Of primary interest is 
estimating the likelihood of successfully launching all 
elements in time to support the discrete TMI Earth departure 
opportunities for the crews going to Mars. 
A key part of the estimating process was to create Gantt 
charts for each of the three Mars exploration missions. Figure 
2 shows the Gantt chart for launches beginning with the first 
launch after the Phobos 2033 opportunity and ending with 
launch of the crew for the Mars 2039 opportunity. Solid or 
pattern colored bars in the Gantt chart represent the planned 
launch to launch critical path timeline of 107 days for ground 
processing, based upon a 5 day per week, 3 shifts per day 
processing capability. White bars indicate available schedule 
margin or slack between launches. Note also that the Gantt 
chart includes the launch that will be used to send up an Orion 
to pick up the crew returning from the Phobos 2033 mission 
and launches being conducted in support of the Mars 2043 
opportunity. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION MODEL  
A stochastic discrete event simulation model was created 
using Rockwell Automation’s Arena simulation software 
[15]. Figure 3 provides a high level overview of the model, 
which includes linkages to Excel files for inputs and results.  
The model logic includes entity routing to reflect all of the 
major processes and operations in the launch and assembly 
sequence from manufacturing completion through readiness 
and performance of the Earth departure burn, as shown in 
Figure 4.   
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Figure 1. Notional EMC ‘Split’ Option Campaign Manifest 
 
Figure 2. Gantt Chart for Mars 2039 
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Figure 3. Model Overview 
 
Figure 4. Flight Hardware Elements Entity Routing Within Model 
  
Analyst sets control variables in the Arena file including risk factor settings. Simulation 
logic implements all activities from manufacturing completion through end of mission. 
Risk models provide opportunities for activities to be delayed or for elements to fail.
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The simulation is run for 1,000 replications, with each 
replication representing one possible manifestation of the 
launch and assembly sequence. The only difference between 
the replications is the random number generation used to 
drive the various risk models. 
Delay Risk Models—All elements for the Evolvable Mars 
Campaign manifest, including MTV elements, launch 
vehicles, and propulsive elements must be manufactured, 
tested, and delivered to their respective space centers. Delays 
in these activities would delay the launch and assembly 
schedule.  
The risk of SLS manufacturing related delays was quantified 
using Space Shuttle historical data. Processing capabilities 
for the SLS at the KSC are limited by facilities and personnel 
constraints. These constraints dictate the planned launch 
schedule for elements. Delays in completing element 
processing and launch vehicle assembly could significantly 
impact the launch and assembly schedule. Delay risks 
through launch for the SLS launch vehicle have been 
previously described in detail [9] and were used again for this 
analysis. Likewise, the SLS launch countdown delay risk 
models used for this analysis are the same as previously 
described [14].  
The delay risk models are based upon Space Shuttle historical 
data taking into account the similarities and differences 
between the Space Shuttle and the SLS and Orion.  Key SLS 
similarities include the major propulsion elements i.e., the 
Solid Rocket Boosters and the Space Shuttle Main Engine or 
RS-25. Key SLS differences include the second cryogenic 
stage of the SLS versus the Space Shuttle Orbiter’s orbital 
maneuvering system. Orion differences include for example 
water landing versus runway landing, as well as solar panels 
and batteries versus fuel cells. For the time being the risk 
models are believed to represent a reasonable estimate.  The 
delay risk models will be updated as required after the SLS 
and the Orion spacecraft establish a processing and flight 
history.  
Ascent Loss of Mission Risk—The launch and ascent of a 
vehicle into LEO is typically one of the most risky phases in 
any space mission. Conducting multiple launches into low 
Earth orbit (LEO) to support the mission exposes the 
assembly campaign to this risk multiple times.  
For this analysis, the assumption of each launch subject to a 
2% chance of an ascent failure was utilized. This value 
assumes that the Space Shuttle derived SLS will be able to 
achieve a reliability level similar to that achieved by the 
Space Shuttle. The model allows alternative values to be used 
so that sensitivity analysis can be performed. It is potentially 
viable to mitigate the risk of ascent failures by having spare 
launch vehicles and spare payload elements available. 
However, there must also be sufficient time to account for the 
post-failure investigation and return-to-flight activities. 
These durations can range from many days to over a year. 
The model allows this duration to be varied so sensitivity 
analysis can be performed.  
Running the Model 
1,000 replications of the simulation are executed to obtain a 
large data set to analyze. Each replication begins with the 
launch of the Exploration Flight Test (EFT)-1 mission in 
2014 and ends after all missions have been launched. After 
each replication, the model records results in an Excel output 
file, including the achieved launch dates for each mission and 
whether or not the TMI opportunities were achieved. In 
addition to writing the results to the output file, the 
deterministic inputs and assumptions that were used during 
the analysis are also recorded. All output graphics and 
analysis are then produced in Excel. 
5. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
The simulation for the notional Split EMC manifest was 
completed, initially using a baseline set of assumptions and 
then simulating various what-if scenarios to see if the overall 
success probabilities for each of the three missions could be 
improved upon. The baseline set of assumptions included: (1) 
the launch schedule as originally given; (2) a constraint that 
the crew could not be launched any earlier than 30 days prior 
to when the TMI window closed; (3) the single string ground 
processing architecture; and (4) no spares (launch vehicles or 
spacecraft).  
The results from the discrete event simulation for the baseline 
set of assumptions (Scenario A) and a limited exploration of 
the trade space (Scenarios B through G) are shown in Figure 
5. The trade space included changing the launch schedule, 
allowing the crew to be launched earlier relative to the 
closing of the TMI window, adding ground processing 
infrastructure, and providing spares.  
The Mars 2039 mission had a very low probability of 
successfully launching all elements to meet the departure 
window in the baseline Scenario A. The launch reliability for 
both the Phobos 2033 and Mars 2043 missions are 
approximately 0.65. However, the reliability for the Mars 
2039 mission is only 0.07. The differential between missions 
is due to the greater number of launches required for the first 
surface mission and the fact that the 2039 mission overlaps 
significantly with both the previous and subsequent missions. 
In Scenario B, the duration of the crew launch opportunity 
was increased to 60 days. This change, however, did not 
significantly improve the launch reliability. This result was 
due to the lack of schedule margin available in the overall 
launch campaign. The cascading delays from previous 
launches did not allow for significant improvement from 
increased margin on the final launch.  
For Scenarios C, D, and E, the available margin was 
increased by “optimizing” the planned launch dates as shown 
in Figure 6. The optimization process included universally 
shifting planned launch dates earlier, adding more margin 
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across the campaign, including the final launch. Note that the 
launch of the Phobos 2033 crew return mission is fixed based 
upon when the crew returns in 2035, so that launch could not 
be shifted. The optimization process was also performed for 
the Phobos 2033 and Mars 2043 launch campaigns. 
Scenario C, which adds the optimized launch campaigns, 
provided significant improvement for Mars 2039 and modest 
improvement for both Phobos 2033 and Mars 2043. The 
added margin in the 2039 mission reduced the risk of 
cascading delays impacting the crew launch.  
Scenarios D and E progressively increased the crew launch 
window by another 30 days in each case. This provided a 
modest increase in success probability with each step, though 
with a declining effectiveness with increased window length.  
For the next case, Scenario F, a mobile launcher and an 
integration high bay were added to the available ground 
infrastructure. This change resulted in a fairly significant 
improvement to the Mars 2039 campaign, modest 
improvement to the Mars 2043 campaign, but essentially no 
improvement to the initial Phobos campaign. The additional 
ground infrastructure allowed the 107 days launch timeline to 
somewhat overlap for different launches since processing for 
the next mission could be done in parallel with the current 
mission. This effectively added additional margin to the 
launch campaign.  
In Scenario G, the capability to launch a replacement mission 
was added with the optimistic assumption that the grounding 
duration after an accident would be minimal. This scenario 
significantly improved the results for all three missions, 
raising the success likelihood for all three missions to 
approximately 95 percent. 
 
 
Figure 5. Quantitative Results and Trade Space 
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Figure 6. Optimized Mars 2033 Launch Campaign
6. ANIMATION FEATURE 
The orchestration required for human exploration of Mars is 
difficult to portray adequately with Gantt charts or even more 
visually rich charts that have gotten the nick name of “Bat 
Charts.”1 Figure 7 is a Bat chart showing a conceptual Mars 
exploration mission from DRA 5.0. It is an invaluable 
resource and, when coupled with a dynamic presenter, 
explains how one goes about getting people to Mars.  
 
 
1 Bat charts typically have the Earth on the bottom and the destination on top 
along with a lander hanging upside down like a sleeping bat.  
Figure 7. Mars DRA 5.0 – “Pre-deployed” & NTR [1]  
Combining the information contained in the campaign 
manifest chart (Figure 1) along with the associated Gantt 
charts, a dynamic visualization or animation can be created 
that goes a step further in demonstrating time-based 
operations and the interaction between elements. The beauty 
of the animation is that it combines the type of information 
found in Gantt charts, manifest charts, and Bat charts, along 
with details provided by presenters, into a short video that can 
tell the whole story into and of itself. Displaying the video 
has more clearly conveyed the complexities involved with a 
human Mars campaign, evoking responses such as, “it looks 
like we are invading Mars!” 
The simulation tool used, Rockwell Automation’s Arena, has 
an embedded animation feature for the entity routing through 
the model code. It also allows the user to create custom 
animations using imported icons and graphics that are more 
familiar to the non-modeling community. Creating these 
custom animations takes additional time and effort, but the 
resulting visual display can tell a compelling story in just a 
few minutes. Unfortunately, given the static nature of this 
paper, the animation is limited to a screen capture, shown in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Animation Screen Shot
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The screen shot from the animation shows that the captured 
date is February 27, 2024, as can be seen at the top or bottom 
right of the screen. The time scale bar graph provides a sense 
of the overall duration of the years being simulated. On this 
particular date, per the Evolvable Mars Campaign under 
study, the Asteroid Redirect Retrieval Mission (ARRM) will 
be on its way back from retrieving a boulder from Asteroid 
TBD (as labeled in Figure 8) and on its way to a lunar distant 
retrograde orbit (LDRO). At that LDRO is an Exploration 
Augmentation Module (pressurized volume to augment 
Orion, referred to as ICH in Figure 1) being supported by 
logistics and crew visit flights delivered by the SLS on an 
annual basis. There is also a satellite orbiting and exploring 
the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos. On the surface of 
Mars are the lander Insight and the rover Mars 2020. The 
International Space Station is in low Earth orbit. An SLS is 
being prepared for the next launch. The most recent launch 
was the EM-4 mission, which took a crew to cis-lunar i.e., 
LDRO.  
When the animation is actively running, all of the launch 
vehicle and spacecraft icons move in accordance with the 
planned operational concept, subject to any delay risk. The 
yellow lines indicate the orbital paths that the spacecraft will 
follow. In the middle of the picture is a feature showing the 
Earth and Mars as they orbit the sun. These icons move in 
relation to one another consistent with how they do so in real 
life. This allows one to visually see when the planetary 
alignments are conducive to the Trans-Mars-Injection 
windows. 
This particular screen shot shows in the information table at 
the bottom that it is running in the deterministic mode such 
that there are no delays or launch vehicle ascent failures. The 
table also indicates that the SLS ground processing 
assumptions reflect 6-day, 2-shift processing through 1 
mobile launcher, 1 integration high bay, and 1 launch pad.  
The speed of the animation can be adjusted with a slide bar, 
not shown, such that 40+ years of exploration can be shown 
in a few minutes or several hours. For an audience already 
familiar with the subject matter a few minutes is typically all 
that is needed to convey the information. If briefing people 
that are new to the subject, the model is run at a slower pace, 
with stops occasionally at key points, to explain what is going 
on and why.  
The animation feature added to the simulation provides 
additional benefit from a modeling perspective. Simulation 
animation is a valuable tool for model verification and 
validation. It allows viewers to see that entities are tracking 
through the correct routing in the model. When the model is 
run in a deterministic model viewers can determine if 
launches are being produced per the planned schedule.  
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FORWARD WORK 
The capability to perform integrated launch and assembly 
campaign reliability risk analysis and visualization using 
discrete event simulation for human exploration of space 
including Mars continues to evolve to meet the demands. As 
NASA and other stakeholders propose new strategies or 
mature existing ones, the models are able to keep pace in 
order to support analysis requirements. New features have 
been added to enhance the value of the tools. 
The quantitative findings for launch campaigns supporting 
discrete Trans-Mars-Injection windows of limited duration 
are consistent with previous analyses [9] [10] [14]. The 
launch and assembly campaign reliability will likely be one 
of the top overall risk drivers. Keys to providing high launch 
and assembly campaign reliability include timely availability 
of launch vehicles and spacecraft, adequate margin in ground 
processing schedules, availability of ground processing 
infrastructure, the ability to launch the crew early relative to 
the closing of the TMI window, the availability of spare 
launch vehicles and spacecraft, and the wherewithal to return 
to flight quickly after a failure. 
Forward work includes modeling additional risk factors that 
are in play relative to achieving TMI windows as well as the 
post TMI risks. The time and effort to produce the animation 
feature, which can be invaluable, needs be reduced. 
Developing additional animation features that drill down into 
key areas, such as launch processing or critical flight 
operations will be considered. 
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